Skip links

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL 2020: Perspectives on the Governance and Institution Provisions

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL 2020: Perspectives on the Governance and Institution Provisions

By Omowunmi Iledare, PhD (GNPC Professor & Chair in Petroleum Economics)

Preamble

Decades of delay in enacting a Petroleum Industry Reform Bill to manage the Nigeria petroleum resources effectively and efficiently, despite many attempts, have caused dwindling revenue, diversion of major investments, extremely low rig activities for exploration and production, low reserves additions, poor economic development, extremely high unemployment rate, extremely low per capital income, and many economic woes for the nation. Thus, the 65 Sections on Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutions (PIGI) in the Chapter One of Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2020 seek to eliminate the amorphous governance and institutional ineptness that have undermined Nigeria petroleum industry growth for decades; and put the sustainability of the industry, in the face of the energy transition dynamics, in jeopardy.

PIGI strives to create and strengthen the industry governance institutions in pursuant of an effective and efficient value creation and delivery to stakeholders. The principles of clear and separation of roles, resolute focus, transparent and good governance across the petroleum industry value chain, triggers the PIGI provisions in PIB 2020. The core objectives of the Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutions are similar to the objectives of the PIGB 2018, which is commendable.  These objectives are laudable and achievable, and they are as follows:

  1. Create efficient and effective governing institutions with clear and separate roles for the petroleum industry.
  2. Establish a framework for the creation of commercially oriented and profit driven petroleum entities to ensure value addition and internationalization of the petroleum industry.
  3. Promote transparency and accountability in the administration of petroleum resources of Nigeria; and
  4. Foster a conducive business environment for the petroleum industry operations.

To achieve these objectives, implementable governance, and institutional provisions in the PIB 2020 to drive the process is imperative. Hence, the creation and empowerment of the following proposed four (4) institutions, a clear departure from the six institutions proposed in the PIGB 2018.  In a nutshell, however, the four key institutions in the executive PIB 2020 in the 9th National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are as follows:

  1. Minister of Petroleum
  2. Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Commission ( the Commission)
  3. Nigerian Petroleum Midstream and Downstream Regulatory Authority (the Authority)
  4. Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited

The two discarded institutions from the proposed PIB 2020 are as follows but one must observe that the expanded role of the Commission seems to include the role of the NPAMC to some extent.

  1. Nigerian Petroleum Assets Management Company (NPAMC).
  2. Nigeria Petroleum Liability Management Company.

Permit me, however, to not reverberate or rehearse the provisions verbatim but limit my discourse, in this op-ed, to key PIGI provisions of consequence in terms of  policy, regulatory, and commercial institutions established to improve good governance, enhance competitiveness, and embrace relevant global best practice with the goal to promote the ease of doing business.

PIGI Provisions on the Policy Institution—the Minster of Petroleum:

Part II of Chapter One of PIB 2020 defines without mincing words the powers of the Minister of Petroleum (MOP), insinuating that MOP is the Institution. The fact that the Minister is responsible for policy setting and direction, coordination and supervision of the oil and gas industry is well articulated.  However, missing conspicuously are the tools, the how, and the manpower to execute this power and discharge the ministerial responsibilities and duties. These omissions make the dependence of the Minister on the commercial and regulatory institutions unescapable.

There are some who have argued, and I concur, that personalizing institutional responsibilities, as the immediate ministerial experience suggests, may not be the way to go, if transparent and accountable governance of the industry is not to be elusive perpetually.  In fact, I hasten to suggest, that nearly every President of Nigeria since 1999, held unto the Ministerial Portfolio of the Ministry of petroleum because of the absolute power confer on the holder of the office.  President Jonathan was an exception, and the industry knows what happened during his term in office.

Further, there is a suggestion, which I wholeheartedly subscribed, that calling the institution the Office of the Minister with permanent technical staff for policy continuity is worth consideration. Of course, looking at the importance of the petroleum sector, a reorganization of the ministry staff structure into technical and administrative cadres can be easily effected, with a provision to that effect in order to prepare the Minister to execute the power of the office effectively and efficiently and if I may, add ethically too. On another note, power and responsibility seem to be used synonymously in Section 3. I hasten to opine that the Powers of the Minister stated particularly in subsections 2 – 5 with respect to usurping the powers of the Boards of the regulatory institutions are bothersome.

For example, stating in 3(3) that the Minister can pre-empt a petroleum product market in a deregulated environment is seemingly anticompetitive. The Minister is not a regulator.  The petroleum product market as envisaged is not a monopoly, either.  Why preempting the market? The language in Section 3 (5) seems authoritarian, unless the President would perpetually occupy the Office of the Minister going forward! No Minister should unilaterally have the power to gazette a policy. Section 3 (5), and of course, I agree that I am not a learned friend, is nebulous to me that the Board cannot debate a policy directive issued by the Minister. I think some of the languages used in describing the powers of the Minister are dictatorial, and perhaps less innovative.

 

PIGI Provisions on the Regulatory Institutions—the Commission and the Authority

Unlike the PIGB 2018, which proposed the establishment of the Nigeria Petroleum Regulatory Commission as a single regulator, vested with petroleum administration and regulatory powers across the petroleum industry value chain – upstream, midstream, and downstream; The PIB 2020 proposes a dual regulator, the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (the Commission) and Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the Authority). The rationale for Dual Regulator, according to PIB 2020 Executive Team, include but not limited to the following, which to some experts are spur-of-the-moment reasoning to a large extent as far as I am concerned.

First the argument that no jurisdiction has a single regulator for the entire petroleum industry value chain does not make single regulator a local best practice for Nigeria. Linearizing global best practice may not in most cases be the best practice for an emerging local economy like Nigeria. More so if the cost benefit analysis is not optimal.  For example, the adoption of the presidential system of government in Nigeria when it did, supports the illogicality of the rationale.  In addition, there is no policy analysis on record to support the dual regulator, yet the petroleum policy gazette endorses a single regulator after a through debate by the Federal Executive Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The second rationale based on the absence of skills and regulatory capacity constraints in mid and downstream seemingly supports a CBN type regulator than the Norway or Brazilian type in the PIB 2020.

The third rationale seems to be based on fear in terms of regulatory capture and super regulatory power.  This is avoidable if institutions are not personalized. The argument for a single regulator is not diminished because of super regulator fear.  CBN is exemplary with respect to the efficacy of a single regulatory institution with a well-defined governance Board that is apolitical. I am not sure two strong regulators as proposed would serve the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria well or better than a single regulator.  We have practiced the single regulatory structure for nearly 60 years, and it did work but can be better with the Commission with a Board approach.  The Department of Petroleum Resources as the regulator of the oil and gas industry across the value ranks the best Nigeria has, despite political interference, of all regulatory institutions as far as I am concerned. Perhaps, if I  am allowed to think aloud, the CBN is the only exception, that ranks along with DPR in that regards. So, I stand corrected but a CBN type regulator is what the industry needs in times like this where the administrative cost of governing the oil and gas industry is excessively high and compared to none worldwide. Of course, I have no vote in the NASS push through a single regulator and I can live with dual regulator for political expediency’s sake, in order for PIB 2020 to avoid the doom or casualty the PIGB 2018 suffered.

The Objects, Functions, and Governance of the Commission:

Section 5 of Part II of the PIB 2020 limits the objects and functions of the Commission to the upstream petroleum industry operations. The Commission is thus established to regulate the technical and commercial activities in petroleum upstream operations among other regulatory functions that are well stated in Sections 7, 8, & 9,  having holistically stated the objectives of the Commission in Section 6. Unfortunately, Section 6 (f, g, h & j) have a great deal of overlap with other agencies of the Federal Government, such SON, Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Petroleum.  There need to be interagency cooperation to avoid encroachment on the responsibilities and functions of the commission.

Regarding Section 6 (f), the question is whether the Commission Board, an apolitical Board, be bound by the directives of the Minister?  Here the language and optics matter for a regulator that stakeholders with diverse interests depend so much upon for fair adjudication of regulations. Asking the Commission to ensure optimal government revenue as a regulator may not necessarily promote efficacy of regulations if optimality of government revenue is a defined objective for a regulator.  Also, of importance with a need to reevaluate is Section 8 (f) with respect to the commercial regulatory function of the Commission. Making arrangement with NNPC within the context of Section 64 is worrisome in appearance for a regulator.  Section 10 (c) and the power of NRA Act must also be resolved as mentioned earlier with respect to other Federal Agencies encroachment into the powers of the Commission.

Section 11 established the Governance Board for the Commission.  Section 11 2 (d) is an incongruity because the Commission has six Executive Commissioner and only two have enough aristocracy to be upgraded unto the Board of the Commission. Could this lead to superiority or inferiority complex among peers? If all cannot be on the Board then no Commissioner other than the Chief Commissioner ought to be on the Board. I prefer all to be on the Board. On another note, for continuity, sake, it was recommended in PIGB that the appointments of the six executive commissioners should be staggered at the beginning of the first Board term and this also applied to the Board members. At the beginning of the initial Board term, some members should be appointed for three years and others for the full term of five years. Finally, the autonomy of the Commission seems to be compromised in Section 24 (9 & 10).  The Commission must not have to report its activities to the Minister, specifically, but to the National Assembly. I know it is a line in the sand that can easily be easily crossed unknowingly.  The Commission is not funded through the Minister’s office. The Commission is an autonomous Institution in order to exercise independence and apolitical in judgement.

The Objects, Functions, and Governance of the Authority:

The Authority is established in Part IV of Chapter One of the PIB 2020.  The objects and functions of the Authority according to Section 30 are limited to midstream and downstream operations in the petroleum industry in Nigeria. Permit me again to limit my comments only to the mechanics of improving the provisions that are relevant to the functions and powers of the authority, rather than rehearse the statements of the provisions. Let me again restate my objection to a dual regulator upfront because it has no policy backing and it seems to have evolved from extemporize thought process. That notwithstanding and as I said earlier, if having a dual regulator is the political expediency required to get the PIB 2020 through, so be it. The passing of the Bill is a political process with compromises here and there from one constituency to another.

The objectives of the Authority as listed in Section 31 are notable. Section 31 (j) needs reevaluation in terms of the emerging deregulated market with respect to developing tariff and price for gas and petroleum products.  This pricing objective is not futuristic and very much out of sync with the petroleum policy and gas policy gazette in 2017.

Regarding the stated functions of the Authority in Section 32, subsections 32(d) and 32 (e) seem impracticable.  Setting a cost benchmark is arduous for a regulator in a dynamic sense with limited skillsets. Perhaps, the Authority may keep in its radar the appropriate cost profiles for downstream and midstream operations.  In a deregulatory environment, the authority must move away from price determination for commercial commodities, regulating supply, distribution, marketing and retailing petroleum products as stated in 32 (e & f). The Authority, certainly, functional power to monitor supply, distribution and marketing of petroleum products and apply sanctions for anticompetitive behaviours.  The authority must be aware of the need for interagency cooperation in the discharge of its duty as stated in 32 (l).

Section 34 established the Board of Governors for the Authority.  Sub-section 2 (d) of Section 34 is also at variance with reality. The Authority has Seven Executive Commissioners and only two are deemed fit to be on the Board. Could this lead to superiority or inferiority complex? If all cannot be on the Board then no Commissioner other than the Chief Commissioner ought to be. I prefer all to be on the Board. On another note, is the need for continuity.  It was recommended that the appointments of the seven executive commissioners should not be for five years at the beginning and this also applied to the Board members. At the beginning of the pioneering Board term, appointments ought to be staggered, some should be for three years and others for the full term.

The autonomy of the Authority seems to be conceded in Section 47 (8 & 9).  The Authority must primarily report directly to the National Assembly and copy the Office of the Minster. I know it is a like drawing a line in the sand that can easily be unknowingly crossed.  The Authority is not to be funded through the Minister’s office. The Authority is an autonomous Institution in order to exercise independence and be apolitical in judgement. The institution does not derive its power from the Minister.

Finally, the provisions under Section 52 of Part IV in PIB 2020 establishing the Midstream Gas Infrastructure Fund, a Governing Council and an Executive Director is inconceivable. No evidence of relevance to the stated objectives of the Authority in Section 31. The establishment of such fund should follow the same process as every other fund before it, PTDF, NCDMB, & PEF, to mention just a few.

PIGI Provisions on the Commercial Institution—the NNPC Limited

The primary commercial entity to be established according to Part IV of Chapter One of PIB 2020 is a limited by shares Nigerian National Petroleum Company under Companies and Allied Matters Act, as proposed in Section 53. At the time of its incorporation, Section 53 (3) states that ownership of all shares shall be vested in the Government and held by the Ministry of Finance Incorporated on behalf of the Government. However, there is no specificity with respect to the time or period to transfer or sell shares to interested stakeholders in the PIB 2020 as was the case in PIGB 2018. However, NNPC Limited shall be subject to the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission but shall not be subject to the provisions of the Fiscal responsibility Act 2007 and the Public Procurement Act 2007. Hence, it is presumed that commercial institution in the PIB 2020 would operate like private commercial company with capitalization and whose shares are traded in any stock exchange market within recognized jurisdiction.

Section 58 established the Board of Governors NNPC Limited which shall perform it duties accordingly.  Section 59 (2) empowers the President to appoint members of NNPC Limited Board of Directors but noted such power of the President to appoint becomes obsolescent when NNPC Limited is not wholly owned by the government.  Section 59 (5) stipulates clearly that shareholders of NNPC Limited shall determine the composition of the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. That the government is willing to allow private funding of NNPC is commendable.

Concluding Remarks

Strikingly, despite ranking among the top twelve petroleum producers worldwide, Nigeria still imports petroleum products – a measure of the poor domestic utilization of its crude oil – which have negatively impacted the multiplier effects of economic development and fiscal budgeting. The tendency to focus on foreign exchange earnings instead of value creation as the basis for its resource development leaves much to be desired and to a large extend emerges, perhaps, from the governance of the oil sector with its institutional amorphousness. This informs the exporting of the bulk of its oil production, which has led to the neglect and dilapidated state of the nation’s refineries and petrochemical industries. Consequently, the fear of incessant shortage of petroleum products, especially gasoline, continues to linger and the oligopolistic power of major petroleum products marketers persist and grappling with the power of a monopoly of the primary transport fuel importer.

Further, uncertainty in crude oil prices – especially plummeting – do have much negative impacts on the trade balance between exported crude oil and imported petroleum products including fiscal budgeting in resource dependent nations like Nigeria. Ironically, once the non-renewable hydrocarbon resources are depleted and the potentials are not efficiently utilized, they are no longer available. If this trend continues and new reserves are not found, it poses a great challenge to the economy at large, especially for countries like Nigeria where petroleum accounts for a large proportion of the economy indices.

The expectations that the passage of a petroleum bill 2020 would erode uncertainties in the petroleum industry and boost investors’ confidence to spur new investments in the Nigeria’s natural resources development are permissible. It is also very plausible that passing the bill might lead to reserves additions, more drilling exploration/exploitation activities, expanding daily oil production output, ensuring revenue improvement for Nigeria and at the same time keep Nigeria internationally competitive and attractive to investors in upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors of the industry. It is also expected that the passage of the bills will facilitate the needed reform and restructuring of the energy sector and full implementation of the approved petroleum and natural gas policy gazette.

Source: The ValueChain 

Join the Discussion